LES SPECIFICITES DES MECANISMES DE GOUVERNANCE DES BANQUES ISLAMIQUES / THE SPECIFICATIONS OF THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE OF ISLAMIC BANKS

Abdelhamid Boulaksili, Mhamed Hamiche, Abdelfattah Lahiala

Abstract


L’objectif assigné à cette recherche est de mieux cerner le rôle des valeurs éthiques et de l’intermédiation participative comme mécanismes spécifiques de contrôle de l’action des managers afin d’assurer un type de management centré sur la maximisation de la valeur du patrimoine des actionnaires. Etant donné que le Conseil de la Shari’ah constitue l’une des spécificités majeures de la gouvernance des banques islamiques, la politique de financement est supposée être encore une variable d’action utilisée indirectement par les actionnaires des banques islamiques pour s’approprier la valeur, ce qui leur permettrait de réduire les pertes de valeur engendrées par les coûts de surveillance ou de contrôle.

 

The objective assigned to this research is to better understand the role of ethical values and participatory intermediation as specific mechanisms for controlling the actions of managers in order to ensure a type of management focused on maximizing the value of shareholders' assets. Given that the Shari’ah council is one of the major specificities of Islamic banks' governance, the financing policy is still supposed to be an action variable indirectly used by Islamic banks' shareholders to capture value. This would allow them to reduce impairment losses caused by monitoring or control costs.

 

JEL: G21, G24, G30

 

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Keywords


valeurs éthiques, intermédiation participative, gouvernance des banques islamiques, mécanismes spécifiques de contrôle / ethical values, participatory intermediation, governance of Islamic banks, specific control mechanisms

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.46827/ejefr.v0i0.719

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