European Journal of Social Sciences Studies
ISSN: 2501-8590
ISSN-L: 2501-8590
Available on-line at: www.oapub.org/soc
Volume 2 │ Issue 8 │ 2017
doi: 10.5281/zenodo.1045295
THE NIGERIAN STATE, DEPRIVATION AND DEMAND FOR
RESOURCE CONTROL IN THE NIGER DELTA REGION
Larry, Steve Ibuomo1i,
Ekundayo, Aduke2
Department of History and Diplomacy,
1
Niger Delta University, Nigeria
Ph.D, Department of History and Diplomacy,
2
Niger Delta University, Nigeria
Abstract:
This paper examines the perceived deprivations in the Niger Delta that have led to the
demand for resource control in the Niger Delta region. The study relies mainly on
secondary sources for its analysis. There is a reliance on existing literature in books,
journals, newspapers and magazines. The piece identifies and historicizes the reasons
for the persistent agitations for self-determination and resource control in the Niger
Delta. It finds that the demand for resource control has been necessitated by the neglect
and deprivation suffered by the people of the region. It is this neglect and deprivation
that have crystallized and metamorphosed into the current resource control conflict that
threatens to dismember the Nigerian state. It concludes that the agitations in the region
cannot be explained only in terms of environmental conflict. The neglect over the years
suffered by the people in terms of provision of infrastructural facilities and their sociopolitical marginalization are crucial in explaining the frequent eruptions in the Niger
Delta.
Keywords: deprivation, marginalization, resource control, natural resources, agitation,
minorities, Niger Delta
1. Introduction
In a multi-ethnic polity like Nigeria, the state is looked upon to co-ordinate and proffer
solutions to the needs of its various command groups, given its dominantly directory
Copyright © The Author(s). All Rights Reserved.
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THE NIGERIAN STATE, DEPRIVATION AND DEMAND FOR
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role. The ambiguous relationship between Nigeria s secular state and its constituents
has popularised the usage of such phrases as internal colonialism (Naanen, 1995) and
ethnic domination
Eteng
, in the analysis of systems of governance by state
managers. The background to the contradictions that has enmeshed the Nigerian state
is located in its dependent and peripheral capitalist system which has impacted
negatively on the state of Nigerian federalism especially in the relationship between
Nigeria s central government and the oil endowed minorities of the south.
Unlike the matured capitalist states whose operations are based on the rule of
law and due process as manifested in its objective standing as an independent and
impersonal force alongside and above the civil society, the post-colonial Nigeria state is
continually bedevilled with crises of legitimacy, lack of impersonality and
independence from both class and communal group domination. With regards to states
in the third world, Naanen provided a clear analytical role of the state when he
observed that: The state appears to hold the key to economic development, to social security, to
industrial liberty and to life and death itself. To understand politics in today’s economic system
is to understand the national state...” Politics tows the line of preservation of personal cum
particularistic group interest to the detriment of efficiency, merit and equity. The
personalization of the apparatus of state sends a wrong signal that the Nigerian state
belongs to some groups who perpetuate a system of internal colonialism and
clientelism in order to remain in power and maintain the statusquo of asymmetrical
power relations.
2. Literature review
‚ke s
assessment of the Nigerian state is that it is non-authorized despite its
superficial impression of autonomy. Power is used to pursue personal interests.
Secondly the plurality of ruling classes unavoidably predisposes the state to whims and
caprices of both foreign and local capitalist. The interest of these combined set of
entrepreneurs do not always coincide but create problems that expose the masses to
economic dispassion as exemplified by laws, liberalization and deregulatory policies.
Thirdly, non-authorization of the state creates situations for which, in-spite of its
centrally distributive activities, the state is unable to bring about equitable socioeconomic development simultaneously within all its sub units. Some of the reasons for
the observed deficiencies are traceable to the fact that economic activities are not subject
to the mediation of market force but in accordance with the personal interest of the
ruling classes who are obliged to concede to compromises for their personal gains.
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The issue of non-authorization of the Nigerian state in the opinion of Eteng
(1997) has economically and politically marginalized a broad section of the Nigerian
society with particular reference to oil producing minorities of southern Nigeria
through:
a) Externally – induced underdevelopment of productive forces;
b) Perennial dependence on foreign technology, raw materials and other essential
inputs;
c) Chaotic and rudimentary commodity production and exchange due, in part to
underdeveloped technology, low capacity utilization and poor integration of the
local economy.
d) Sustenance of the
excessive and extortionist taxation and intolerable
appropriation of the producing masses, including the peasantry
e) Constant scarcity and continuously increasing stagflationary pressures.
f) Inadequate and discriminatory distribution of rewards and opportunities.
g) Acute deprivation and mass poverty amidst oil wealth
h) Intense class and communal competition and attendant violent conflicts and
i) State repression and socio-economic and political instability.
These excerpts are prelude to the expropriatory policies purposed by the federal
government on oil endowed communities in the Niger Delta region. It is interesting to
note that the major ethnic groups who in time past were committed to decentralized
government as in the strict adherence to regionalization are currently moving expressly
towards unitary government. This development is predicated on the enormous wealth
and power at the disposal of controllers of the federal government given the unequal
distributive system employed by the ruling classes. For this reason, the struggle for
state power has become a do or die affair leading to politics of anxiety
‚ke
and
eventual political marginalization of peasants as exemplified in the equation of might is
right through political repression. The trend of events in the country with particular
reference to political processes is an indication that, in practice, the federal system has
left some communal groups uneasy and therefore suspicious of others. A review of
some federal policies with regards to federal revenue exposes the expropriatory agenda
of the federal government. It also confirms Eteng s
stance that, striking together
under a federal structure has always been most advantageous for some communal groups in
power but disastrous even genocidal for some especially minorities”.
The fact of the matter remains that, with highly priced value of crude oil,
Nigeria s political elites who are mostly of non-oil producing regions (Naanen 1995)
have continued to maintain their control of state apparatus with which they initiate
obnoxious expropriator policies which centralize the economy in the federal
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government as first step in an asymmetrical distributive system. The over centralization
of socio-political matters in Nigeria is a major challenge to sustainable development in
the Niger Delta region. This hinges on the fact that the state s central role predisposes
geographic units to uneven and unequal development due to its enormous resources.
2.1 Expropriatory Laws a Deprivation
In view of the highly priced value of crude oil, elites of non-oil producing regions have
continued to maintain their control to state apparatus with which they initiate
obnoxious expropriatory policies which centralize the economy in the federal
government. We will briefly examine these expropriatory polices that created the
enabling environment for resource distortions and laid the foundation for conflict in the
region. These laws include; the Offshore Oil Revenue Decree No. 9 of 1971; Territorial
Waters Act, CAP 428 Laws of the federation, 1990 as amended by Act No.1 of 1998; The
Exclusive Economic Zone Act Cap.116 Laws of 1990 as amended by Act 42 of 1998; and
the Land Use Act Cap 202 Laws of the federation and Exploration Licences Cap 350
Laws of the federation.
2.2 Offshore Oil Revenue Decree No 9 of 1971
The take-over of government by the military in 1966 unfortunately led to the
centralization of fiscal power and the erosion of the federal nature of governance in
the country. The military replaced the four regions with
number of states has since grown to
vassal states in
. The
.The demolition of federalism by the military
reached its climax when it promulgated the Petroleum Decree (No. 51) in 1969 which
vested ownership and control of all petroleum resources in, under or upon any land in
the Federal Military Government. This was followed by the Offshore Oil Revenue
Decree No. 9 of 1971 which abrogated the rights and entitlements of the littoral
regions/states in the minerals (and revenue thereof) found offshore. The latter decree
vested the territorial waters, continental shelf as well as royalties, rents and other
revenues derived from or relating to the exploration, prospecting, or search for,
winning or working of petroleum from seaward appurtenances (offshore) in the Federal
Government only. The decree found its way into the 1979 and 1999 constitutions
promulgated by the military for in-coming civilian governments. Section 40(3) of the
1979 constitution (repeated as section 44(3) of the 1999 constitution) said that:
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the entire property in and control of
all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas, under or upon the territorial waters and the exclusive
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economic zone of Nigeria shall vest in the Government and the Federation and shall be managed
in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.”
The above named decree repealed section 140(6) of the constitution which
originally recognised the continental shelf of a state as part of the state. Decree
reverts
such ownership to the federal military government. Accordingly, royalties, rents and
revenue from petroleum exploration and exploitation from all territorial waters accrue
to federal government. The Decree No 9 made this claim possible. The reason given by
the then military government for its action, was to enable government successfully
achieve its national policy of reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction after the
destructions of the 1967-70 civil war. Though the decree was later repealed, new
intrigues within government circle led to its reintroduction.
2.3 Territorial Waters Act, CAP 428 Laws of the Federation, 1990 as amended by Act
No. 1 of 1998
Territorial waters, or a territorial sea, as defined by the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (in Adeyemi, 2010), is a belt of coastal water extending at most 12
nautical miles (22km; 14mi) from the baseline (usually the mean low-water mark) of a
coastal state. The territorial sea is regarded as the sovereign territory of the state,
although foreign ships (both military and civilian) are allowed innocent passage
through it; this sovereignty also extends to the airspace over and seabed below. The
term territorial water is also sometimes used informally to describe any area of water
over which a state has jurisdiction, including internal waters, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and potentially the continental shelf.
Normally, the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured is the lowwater line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the
coastal state. This is either the low-water mark closest to the shore, or alternatively it
may be an unlimited distance from permanently exposed land, provided that some
portion of elevations exposed at low tide but covered at high tide (like mud flats) is
within 12 nautical miles (22km; 14mi) of permanently exposed land. Straight baselines
can alternatively be defined connecting fringing islands along a coast, across the
mouths of rivers or with certain restrictions across the mouths of bays. In this case, a
bay is defined as a well-marked indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to width
of its mouth as to contain land-locked waters and constitutes more than a mere curvature of the
coast. An indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as, or
larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of that
indentation”. The baseline across the bay must be no more than 4 nautical miles 44km
in length. A state’s territorial sea extends up to
8mi
nautical miles from its baseline. If this would
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overlap with another state’s territorial sea, the border is taken as the median point between the
states’ baselines, unless the states in question agree otherwise. A state can also choose to claim
smaller territorial sea (Adeyemi, 2010).
Conflicts still occur whenever a coastal nation claims an entire gulf as its
territorial waters while other nations only recognize the more restrictive definitions of
the UN convention. Two recent conflicts occurred in the Gulf of Sidra where Libya has
claimed the entire gulf as its territorial waters and the U.S. has twice enforced freedom
of navigation rights, in the
and
Gulf of Sidra incidents. Nigeria s territorial
waters refer to the open sea within twelve (12) nautical miles as the seaward limits of
inland waters. The resource within this region it is gas or crude oil is deemed to be
owned by federal government as against previous claim to sovereign rights. This Act is
virtually a repetition of that pronounced by the military government in 1971. The
obvious reasons for the repetition is because of increased revenue from oil and the
desire of controllers of state power to amass their share of the wealth by the
subordination of resource endowed communities. However, there is also a recent Water
Act worthy of mention here. This is the Coastal and Inland Shipping (Cabotage) Act,
2003. Although not an amendment of the 1998 Territorial Waters Act, it nevertheless
represents a complementary attempt at checking foreign infringement of the countries
inland water resources. In this regard, the Act restricts the use of foreign vessels in
domestic coastal trade.
2.4 The Exclusive Economic Zone Act Cap 116 Laws of 1990 as amended by Act 42 of
1998
‚ state s exclusive economic zone starts at the seaward edge of its territorial sea and
extends outward to a distance of 200 nautical miles (370.4km) from the baseline. The
exclusive economic zone stretches much further into sea than the territorial waters,
which ends at 12 NM (22km) from the coastal baseline (if following the rules set out in
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in Adeyemi, 2010). Thus, the EEZ includes
the contiguous zone. States also have rights to the seabed of what is called the
continental shelf up to 350 nautical miles (648km) from the coastal baseline, beyond
EEZ, but such areas are not part of their EEZ. The legal definition of the continental
shelf does not directly correspond to the geological meaning of the term, as it also
includes the continental rise and slope, and the entire seabed within the EEZ. Nigeria s
geographic location at the strategic corner of Africa in the Gulf of Guinea within the
South Atlantic Ocean makes her a maritime nation. Her sea frontiers extend from Long
o
E to Long
o
E covering a distance of about
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protrude seaward to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) limit of 200 nm, which gives a
total surface area of about 84,000sq nm.
The Exclusive Economic Zone Act Cap 116 Laws of 1990 as amended by Act 42 of
1998 is an Act to delimit the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria being an area
extending up to 200 nautical miles seawards from the coasts of Nigeria. Within this
Zone, and subject to universally recognized rights of other States (including land-locked
States), Nigeria would exercise certain sovereign rights especially in relation to the
conservation or exploitation of the natural resources (minerals, living species, etc.) of
the sea bed, its subsoil and superjacent waters and the right to regulate by law the
establishment of artificial structures and installations and marine scientific research,
amongst other things. The economic zone includes an area of about 200 nautical miles
off the coast of Nigeria. Like the Territorial Waters Act, the federal government reserves
the right to exploitation or reservation of the natural resources contained within the
subsoil or seabed whether it is living organism or mineral resources.
Similarly, federal gritty to regulate the erection of artificial structures and
installation of marine scientific research equipment where necessary. This is the crux of
the controversy over contiguous zone and continental shelf, and the dichotomy
between onshore and offshore derivation entitlements. The application of these
conditions as spelt out by the Exclusive Economic Zone Act is oppressive and not in the
interest of the economic well-being of oil bearing communities.
2.5 The Land Use Act CAP 202 Laws of the Federation and Oil Exploration Licences
CAP 350 Laws of the Federation
The Niger Delta crisis was initially indexed on a prolonged socio-economic and political
alienation marked by poverty, hunger, disease and environmental degradation. The
Niger Delta, especially in the oil-producing communities – features perpetuated human
insecurity (basic needs), lack of infrastructures, wanton ecological damages, theft and
unjust distribution of revenue from the sale of oil, coupled with perceived apathy on
the part of government and the multinational oil companies in spite of significant
contribution of crude oil to the Nigerian and global economy. Thus, the discovery of oil
in the Niger Delta, instead of serving as means of blessing for the region brought total
deprivation of the people from their own property and consequentially endangered
meaningful growth and development. As a result, social conflict (Adeyemi 2010) which
featured between militants on one hand the local elites, government and the
multinational oil companies on the other hand ensued. This also degenerated into the
problem of hostage-taking and kidnapping of expatriates in the Niger Delta region, for
whopping ransom.
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Prominent indigenes and political elites within the region were not also spared in
the hostage for ransom threat. Thus, what started as resource control militancy,
transformed into kidnapping and hostage taken business in the Niger Delta region, and
which has also extended to other regions in the country.
Understanding the critical issues of the crisis in the Niger Delta lies in the
understanding of the question of, who owns the land ? Answers to this question
require some retrospective analysis. Retrospectively, the colonial state promulgated
Mineral Act in 1911 for their economic interest, which denied communities ownership
of their natural endowment. The disempowerment of the people s right to natural
resources also became a peculiarity of the post-colonial state. After independence, the
Nigerian State formulated the Oil Mineral Act of 1969 which established the power to
control, absolutely, all mineral resources, including oil, within the territory of Nigeria in
the Federal Government. This was further strengthened by the promulgation of the
Land Use Decree in 1978. The Land Use Decree invested the ownership of all land in
Nigeria in the government. Prior to this decree, land was communally owned and the
various traditional rulers, clan heads, and community leaders had the power to
determine customary law insofar as this affected land tenure and use (Tuodolo, 2008).
The implication of the Act, in relation to the belief of the people, is that the
people of the Niger Delta became tenants in their own homeland and a subject to
institution that they neither recognized nor able to understand or relate to. As the Act
bestowed power to allocate land for development purposes to the government
(represented by the NNPC), the government and the oil companies deeply reap the
enormous benefits from the exploration of oil in the regions and the people of the Niger
Delta were left to be engulfed by a recycled poverty. The multinational oil companies;
mainly Shell, Chevron/Texaco, and Elf, have treated both the people and the
environment with total disdain and hostility (Omoweh, 2010) and align with brutal and
corrupt regimes to protect the exploitation of land and people by providing the
Nigerian military and police with weapons, transport, logistical support and finance.
This, invariably, subject the region to what Rowell (1969) described as ecological
disaster zone. Most often, oil spills and fires are regular occurrences, causing the death
of the local people as well as the destruction of wildlife and property. To further expose
exploitative alliance between government and multinationals, issues relating to oil
spills have been politically attended to over decades. As argued by Omoweh (2010).
The 1978 Land Use Decree further re-asserted the state s ownership of the land,
inclusive of its content.... As such, it will be illegal for those who live in oil–producing
areas to protest against oil spillage, gas flaring and other forms of environmental
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degradation since they do not own the land or oil, and no attention is given to pollution
in a minefield.
In furtherance, he noted that: Until the oil companies spill about 10,000 barrels in a
single incident, the state regards it as no spill, though, with such volume of oil lost to the
ground, severe havoc been wreaked on the environment.”
Against the backdrop of the above assertion, it become unequivocal that the state
and oil companies had engaged in some sort of exploitation partnerships, which subject
the oil-producing communities to unabated poverty and their irresponsibility in the
discharge of their legal and social responsibilities. This exploitative partnership had
enriched the opportune political class and the oil companies through primitive
accumulation of wealth from the bowel of the region. Scourge of poverty in the region
is grim with people lacking basic human needs and the environment wilfully and
constantly degraded by the oil companies. The level at which poverty rate was rooted
in the region was pointed by World Bank (1995) and United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) (2006). World Bank comprehensive study pointed out that the
Niger Delta is the least developed area of the Nigeria. Per capita income was less than
$280 per annum, with high rising population. Indices of development such as
education, health, sanitation, job creation, water and other physical infrastructures were
far below acceptable standards. Environmental resources were gradually being
degraded and there was an extremely poor human capacity and basic skills. In the same
vein, the 2006 Niger Delta Human Development Report by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) noted that the Niger Delta is a region suffering from
administrative
neglect,
crumbling
social
infrastructures
and
services,
high
unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth, squalor, and endemic conflict.
Suggesting reasons for the prevalence and causes of conflicts, Omoweh, (2010)
noted that as inevitable as conflicts are, they worsen if there is a crisis of governance
and weak or failing institutions. Nigeria government has apparently proved beyond
reasonable doubt that its failed institutions could not amiably halt the festering crisis in
the region. Rather, the institutions of the state are used as an instrument of oppression
at the detriment of peoples wishes. Thus at the initial stage of their struggle, militants,
in championing the course for socio-economic and environmental emancipation,
engaged in sabotaging oil installations, hostage taking, and carrying out lethal car
bombings. This, perhaps, indicates a pragmatic shift from the initial Ghandi-like
revolutionary struggle by Ken Saro-Wiwa (after the Isaac AdakaBoro era) to a
militarized violent movement towards ascertaining the wishes and desires of an
average people of the Niger Delta. This finally metamorphosed to the worse form of
kidnapping and hostage taking.
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With the exception of lands earmarked for the federal government or any of its
agencies, this Act confers all land within urban centre to a state in the governor of the
state. The governor holds the land on trust for the people as well as welds the power of
allocation of such land. In the same vein the local government is entrusted with custody
of lands in rural setting. All other rights or owner – occupier in case of mineral
prospecting is subjected to the right of the federal government. What this means in
essence is that all exploration and mining leases are granted directly by the federal
government without recourse to the local communities. Same federal government solely
approves the right of way for laying of pipelines without reference to local communities
(Hutchful, 1985). Prospecting companies are merely expected to pay damages or
compensation for surface rights only to any person who owns or is in lawful occupation
of the license of leased land beyond the stipulated surface rights. So, compensations
paid are in view of deprivation to agricultural use and nothing more.
Considering the prominence and huge revenue from petroleum and the low
level of development of the producing communities, there is no gainsaying the fact that
these Acts and related decrees accord the federal government monopoly control over
petroleum resources (as these are not found on land surfaces) while the endowed
communities are deprived of meaningful livelihood and all these have contributed to
the demand for resource control in the region.
2.6 Oil Economy and the Revenue Allocation Debacle in Nigeria
As an observable dynamics, the politics of revenue sharing was brought to limelight
when oil became the main source of national revenue and oils the wheels of the
Nigerian economy. The various revenue allocation commissions that were constituted
when oil gradually displaced agriculture as the pivot of the nation s economy trickled
down the derivation percentage, and eventually displaced and relegated it to the
background. The commissions were the Binns (1964), Dina (1968), Aboyade (1977), and
the Okigbo (1980) Revenue Allocation Commissions (Odje, 2000). It is important to note
that the interest of minorities does not count if they do not have a significant
representation in the ruling class. Therefore, instead of derivation that hitherto benefits
the regions, the commissions lay emphasis on Need, Population, Landmass, Balance
Development, Equality of states, National Minimal Standard etc., to the detriment of the
goose that lays the golden egg. Without mincing words, the implication is the deliberate
and criminal transfer of the oil wealth out of the Niger Delta to develop other regions. It
is evidently clear with the ascendance of oil (found mainly in the homelands of the
ethnic minorities as the pivot of the nation s economy, the interest of derivation on the
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part of those who wields state power faded, given that it will now promote the interest
of the minorities who do not control state power (Ibaba, 2005).
The abundant crude oil in the minority territories of the Niger Delta region
became a subject of envy, and the majority groups adopted every means to ensure that
the owners receives very little benefit from it (Odje, 2000). Due to the difficult terrain of
the Niger Delta, and the effect of oil exploration and production, the region obviously
needs more funds to promote development, hence agitations to reverse to at least 50%
derivation fund for the region. Some may argue that, the Niger Delta, which is agitating
for increment in the derivation percentage equally benefits from the era the principle
held sway in the pre-oil economy. However, the undeniable truth is that, the region was
balkanized into the Eastern and Western regions, where they constitute minorities. For
example, the Western Ijaws in present Delta State were minorities in the Yoruba
dominated western region, and as such were even excluded from the famous free
education legacy that the Yorubas enjoyed. More so, the glaring need of development
and absence of basic social infrastructures, excruciating poverty and backwardness in
the region corroborates the fact that the Niger Delta was a neglected part of the regions.
New conditions produce new negotiations, consensus, balancing and new problemsolving responses. As a resolve to make federalism more relevant to development and
governance increases, so do consultations, dialogue, negotiation and consensus over
emerging issues grow (Adeyemi, 2010). However, it is sad to note that since 1995,
efforts to revise the revenue allocation fomula have been bogged down by intrigues.
State and local government creation is a tactics of revenue sharing in Nigeria.
Since, the states are not viable economically, but totally dependent on the monthly
allocation from the federal government, ethnic groups and regions balkanized into
more states, receives more from the federation account (Adeyemi, 2010 and Akinola,
2011), and that does not benefit the Niger Delta. According to Onigbinde, 2008) once a
state is spilt into two, each of the parts become equal with those that remain intact with
respect to the size of allocation to be received automatically from the federal
government. The equality principle, for instance, has been the major incentive for the
proliferation of non-viable sub-federal administrations in Nigeria since it ensure that
each constituent unit (no matter how demographically small and administratively and
financially weak) is guaranteed an equal share with other units of nearly half of federal
revenue in the horizontal distributable pool. In this way, the existence in Nigeria of too
many sub-national governments which simply exist to receive and consume their own
equal shares of central financial hand-outs has undermined the very essence of
governance (Adeyemi, 2010). More so, the issue of using local government as criteria for
revenue allocation short changes the Niger Delta region.
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Bayelsa State (which accounts for about 40% of oil production in Nigeria), for
instance has only 8 local government areas, as against Kano state with 44 local
government areas. Pitiably, it is the oil wealth that is used to fund the economically
non-viable political enclave created to enrich elites and their cliental cohorts. What is
good for the goose is good for the gander. But as a ploy to deliberately puncture the
argument of derivation, scholars and politicians alike from zones outside the Niger
Delta are even ignorantly laying claim to oil in the region. For instance, Odje (2000)
advances an organic theory of the state in which groups with recognized identity cannot
now use such to lay claim to national resources that are found in their homeland.
Consequently, he argued that if everybody should take exclusive membership and
control of the natural resources in their area, as those attacking the corporate existence
of Nigeria are demanding, then those states of Nigeria upstream from the Niger Delta,
in the Niger-Benue basin, should take exclusive ownership and control of the river,
water and its sediments drained away from them to form the delta and its hinterland,
and demand their share from the returns from the export of crude oil and gas in
proportion to what their vegetation, dead bodies, animals and fertile soil, generally
contributed to the making of these minerals for hundreds of thousands, and even
million, of years. Be that as it may, the claim to oil resources, advanced by Usman (a
northerner), for the states of the north on the basis of their geographical location, has
extended application. First, those countries from which and through which the Nile
river flows would lay claim to Egypt and its wealth.
That is, Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia would lay historic claims to the resources of
the Nile Delta in Egypt. Secondly, if the argument is correct, then the farmlands in
Benue-Niger valleys that benefits from the flow of the Niger and Benue through
Guinea, Senegal, Mali, Cameroun and Niger, should be claimed by those other
countries from which their fertility is derived (Eteng, 1997). More so, apostles of nonderivation often argue that the continued use of derivation will accelerate uneven
progress and development in the country, which is unacceptable. By the very nature of
fiscal decentralization, disproportionate growth and development is inevitable. Again,
reference can hardly be made to a developing country with a decentralized fiscal
system that has achieved balanced development. We must reiterate the fact that, the
argument of the apostles of increased derivation (the people of the Niger Delta) is that,
they are victims of environmental degradation, destruction of the ecosystem and their
source of livelihood.
The cost of infrastructural development is very high due to the marshy terrain of
the region with the myriad of rivers and creeks that characterize the region. The Niger
Delta question is the creation of the unsatisfactory fiscal relations between the regions
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and the federal government, and it equally explains the haggling and agitations to
increase the derivation principle to at least 50% as was applicable in the sixties. It is
pertinent to buttress the fact that, corruption which has eaten deep into the Nigerian
body polity is not an exception in the Niger Delta. Therefore, with the present 13%
derivation principle as enshrined in the 1999 Nigerian constitution, there are claims that
the Niger Delta state should first account for 13% fund accrued to them for the past
decade before demanding for more.
Objective as it seems, calling upon the oil producing states to account for past
allocations from the federation account has a hegemonic intent. It is actually intended to
have a sobering and weakening effect on the argument for derivation principle because,
it is selective. Otherwise, this call torches on accountability an issue that affects all the
states of the federation, oil and non-oil bearing states, as well as the federal government,
because, none can be shown to have made prudent use of its share of the federation
account significantly for the benefit of its constituency (Onigbinde, 2008). Put
differently, corruption is not the exclusive preserve of the Niger Delta. Corruption
cannot be the defining variable in the determination of who gets what, when and how;
it cannot be. Therefore corruption cannot be used as a criterion to judge whether to
increase or reduce derivation percentage that accrues to oil producing states.
And that those who wields political power, use it to appropriate more resource
to themselves and ethnic groups, and leave those who do not control state power with
peanuts and mere tokens. The revenue sharing formula in Nigeria is undoubtedly
skewed in favour of the major ethnic groups to the detriment of the minority ethnic
groups in the Nigeria federal system. The revenue sharing mentality has also breaded
laziness and eroded hard work as a virtue. The reason being that it had introduced
corrupt, unjust and bias criteria of appropriating and allocating national resources. This
has caused dissatisfaction, discontent and agitations for redress in the Nigerian state.
Most states in the federation have nothing to show for the huge financial allocations
they receive from the federal government. And until the trend is revised to make them
productive, the drive for competitive development will be elusive.
3. Conclusion
The Niger Delta region is naturally endowed with vast oil and gas deposits. The
resources attracted the Anglo-Dutch consortium, Shell D ‚rchy - a subsidiary of Shell
British Petroleum for the purpose of prospecting for crude oil. With the discovery of
crude oil in Oloibiri in 1956, exploratory activities in the Niger Delta became intensified.
The intensification of exploratory activities contributed immensely to the Nigerian State
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powering economic growth and development. Apart from its contribution of about 90
percent to Gross Domestic Product, crude oil also accounts for about 95% of the
expected revenue upon which national budget estimates are based. With these
enormous contributions of the Niger Delta region to national treasury, the indigenes
naturally expect that the economic order will better their lots remarkably by providing
employment opportunities, infrastructural development, improved standard of living
and above all, sustainable development.
The most perplexing paradox is that, rather than better the lots of the host
communities in the Niger Delta, development is skewed in their disfavour. The overall
picture that pervades the region is that virtually all the host communities have one sad
tale or the other to share about their miserable experience heaped on them by the
multinational oil companies in return for exploiting crude oil in their lands. The
inhabitants of the Niger Delta generally felt marginalized, cheated and left out in the
lurch from the concomitant largesse of contemporary oil revenues. These feelings
coupled with the expropriatory laws and repressive measures exhibited by government
led to the outright demand for the control of their resources by the people of the Niger
Delta.
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