In Nigeria, democratic transitions and elections have been intermittently managed and conducted by both military and civilian administrations, however, there are have been a recurrent debates on which of these two administrations have best conducted democratic transition and acceptable election in Nigeria? This debate has further challenged the efficacy and essence of democracy as a viable tool for the advancement of socio-economic and political aspirations of the ‘common man’ in Nigeria. This study argues that, it is erroneous to assume that civilian administration has performed credibly well in terms of democratic transition and conduct of credible election as against their military counterpart in Nigeria: that given the account of democratic transition/election conduct under the military regime, it is quite obvious that the challenges during military is not on their inability to manage transition or to conduct election. The major problem is the self-succession ambition and personification of political office syndrome of the military leaders. Unlike the transition and election conduct under the civilian administrations in 1964/65, 1983 and 2007 which was highly characterized by inability to manage transition programmes, conduct free, fair and credible election, self-succession ambition, coupled with pervasiveness of ethnicity, religion cleavages and centrifugal politics. By implications, the challenges to democratic transition/election conduct were enormous in the First, Second and to some extent Fourth Republic under the civilian administrations. Keywords: Election, democratic transition, regime types, performance-assessment, Nigeria

─Abstract ─ This paper examined the military as an institution and its role in democratic succession in Nigeria. The paper articulated on how various republics in Nigeria failed and what role the military played during these periods. The study relied mainly on secondary data sources, which includes periodicals and other archival documents that provided the required information for the discourse. Data gathered were analyzed through content analysis. Critical and logical analysis of data attested that the military had played the role of distractive force in Nigeria's democratization process. The military institution presented itself and acted in most occasions as a false custodian of democratic principles by initiating and implementing flawed elections for transition. However, emerging facts further suggest that these democratic principles and arrangements put in place by the military were usually faulty and inadequate for sustainable democratic governance to thrive on. Most general elections organized by the military to transit power have been descriptive of milidemocray, where previous military officers acquire democratic power through stage managed processes. The military institution therefore has functioned as a partisan organisation where various acts of election packaging were learnt and electioneering overtures acquired, despite its instrumental role in sustaining democracy in the country. This paper therefore concludes that the military has been more of a distractive than consolidation force of democratic transitions, and free and fair elections in Nigeria democracy, since her independence.

Leadership succession is the problem facing Nigeria since 1960. The mode of transfer power from one government to another is always accompanied by tension. This tension is anchored on the fact that leaders are imposed. The problem has been attributed to the persistent interruption by the military, since 1960. With inception of democracy in 1999, there was positive hope about leadership succession in the country, but the reverse was the result as all elections conducted were seriously accompanied by tensions. It is against this background, that this paper examines the challenges of succession in Nigeria’s fourth republic. The paper also revealed that despite the potential of democracy in ensuring smooth power transfer, the failure of political leaders to observe the rules guiding the process portrays democracy as an incompetent system. It is also reveals that the majority of politicians did not believe in the ethos of democracy. Therefore, the paper has concluded that orderly transfe...

Many federal systems incorporate presidential system with individual or dual executive. Such executive presidencies are imbued with substantial powers, dominating politics and government with far-reaching implications. The potential advantage of presidential system is 'often challenged by the occurrence of divided governments' capable of thwarting executive's potential successes.Recurringintra-institutionalleadership crisis borne out of high-wired politics, personal and political differences negating the spirit of the Constitution and threatening democratic consolidation suffice.Such crisis underlines the limitations of individual and dual executives amidst agitations for amendment to perceived flaws in constitutional provisions in emerging democracies. The Nigeria's 1999 Constitution provides for dual executive presidency comprising a President and a Vice-President jointly elected for a renewable four-year term of office.The predominance of viable governing institutions, as opposed to personal leadership was an aberration prior to the embrace of popular government. Abstract-Many federal systems incorporate presidential system with individual or dual executive. Such executive presidencies are imbued with substantial powers, dominating politics and government with far-reaching implications. The potential advantage of presidential system is 'often challenged by the occurrence of divided governments' capable of thwarting executive's potential successes.Recurringintra-institutionalleadership crisis borne out of high-wired politics, personal and political differences negating the spirit of the Constitution and threatening democratic consolidation suffice.Such crisis underlines the limitations of individual and dual executives amidst agitations for amendment to perceived flaws in constitutional provisions in emerging democracies. The Nigeria's 1999 Constitution provides for dual executive presidency comprising a President and a Vice-President jointly elected for a renewable four-year term of office.The predominance of viable governing institutions, as opposed to personal leadership was an aberration prior to the embrace of popular government. The vices of authoritarian rule and crises-infested states informed a consideration for an executive presidency that could muster the requisite leadership and political will to offer a rallying point for diverse interests to act with dispatch and stabilize the polity. This paper interrogates a crisis-ridden executive presidency whose background and internal contradictions tainted its leadership content and political character that threatened its institutional viability. Dictatorial tendencies vis-à-vis personality politicsmanifestin the intra-institutional and power relation dynamics to undermine cohesion. Richard Joseph's conceptual notion of the Nigeria State and politics, prebendalism vis-à-vis the Nigerian experience in military rule constitute the theoretical and contextual framework for interrogating the institutional inadequacies under reference.

The wave of democratization in the post cold war era has contributed to democratic transition in most African states. However, stability remains scarce in most of these nascent democracies. Borrowing from the experience of Nigeria in the fourth republic, the study examined whether lack of political power alternation undermines democratic stability. Using secondary data collected from documentary sources, a qualitative descriptive method of analysis, the study argues that lack of governmental turnover undermines democratic stability. Relying on the theory of post-colonial state, we demonstrated that the limited autonomy of the Nigerian state and its employment as a means of primitive accumulation by the ruling elite has led to intense struggle on the one hand by the ruling party to retain itself perpetually in power and a corresponding struggle on the other hand by the opposition to change the status quo. As a corollary, we note that while the ruling party uses the instrument of the ...