



MEASURING POLITICAL SUPPORT UNDER CENSORSHIP: REZA PAHLAVI'S TRUE SUPPORT AMONG NAMED-PREFERENCE ANTI-REGIME IRANIANS (2024–2026)

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Abstract:

Recent surveys substantiate that Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi is a prominent opposition figure among Iranians who oppose the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, research indicates that direct questioning in authoritarian states may misconstrue the support for anti-regime figures. This paper estimates Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi's true level of support among Iranians who (a) oppose the Islamic Republic AND (b) actively name a preferred political leader — the politically engaged, preference-holding segment most relevant to democratic transition scenarios. In this report, we deploy Margaret E. Roberts' Fear-Friction-Flooding censorship framework, Bayesian preference falsification correction, digital revealed preference analysis, and protest-calibrated estimation to data from the GAMAAN survey of 77,216 respondents (June 2024) [1], Instagram metrics

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(2022–2026), and the January 2026 nationwide protests (≈ 5 million participants). We find that Pahlavi commands 59.0% of raw support among anti-Islamic Republic Iranians who named a political figure, rising to a corrected 77.0% after accounting for censorship-driven preference falsification, temporal growth, and revealed preferences from protest participation. Sensitivity analysis across 54 parameter scenarios yields an interquartile range of 70.0% – 83.4%. Among Iranians with an active political preference who want the Islamic Republic replaced, Pahlavi holds a commanding supermajority that has grown substantially since mid-2024.

Keywords: Iran, censorship, preference falsification, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, survey methodology, protest, digital revealed preferences, named-preference analysis

1. Introduction

When a survey asks, "Who would you support as a transitional leader?" in an authoritarian state, responses fall into several categories [\[2\]](#):

- Named a specific figure — expressing an active political preference
- "No one" / "Don't know" — either genuinely undecided, politically disengaged, or too afraid to name anyone
- Non-response — declined to answer

Standard analyses report support as a percentage of ALL respondents (including categories 2 and 3), which dilutes the signal. A respondent who says "don't know" is fundamentally different from one who actively selects a figure — particularly under censorship, where "don't know" may itself be a form of preference falsification. This paper focuses exclusively on respondents who named a specific political figure and who oppose the Islamic Republic's continuation — the population segment most relevant for assessing transition dynamics. This approach follows the logic of Roberts' (2018) insight that censorship creates different response patterns across population segments, and that the politically engaged subset carries a disproportionate analytical signal.

2. Research Question

Reza Pahlavi is widely recognized as a leading opposition figure in Iran, though the extent of his actual support remains uncertain due to questionable survey results and ongoing censorship. A key question remains:

- Among Iranians who a) oppose the Islamic Republic, and b) actively identify a preferred political leader, what is Reza Pahlavi's actual level of support as of early 2026?

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1 Roberts' Censorship Taxonomy Applied to Iran

Roberts [3] conceptualizes censorship as three mechanisms: Fear: The Islamic Republic's security apparatus monitors social media, arrests dissidents, and executes protesters. In January 2026 alone, an estimated 3,428–6,800 people were killed and 53,777 arrested [4] (These numbers are early estimations). This creates severe self-censorship even in anonymous surveys. Friction: Iran operates one of the world's most restrictive internet censorship regimes. Accessing Instagram (where Pahlavi has 9.2M followers) requires VPN usage. The GAMAAN survey itself required VPN access, creating selection bias toward more technically capable and politically motivated respondents [5]. Flooding: State media and bot networks actively promote regime narratives and attempt to fragment the opposition. The regime's own pollster (ISPA) found 92% dissatisfaction, suggesting that even flooding efforts cannot prevent awareness of governance failures [6].

3.2 Why Named-Preference Analysis Matters

In a censored environment, the "Don't know" category is contaminated by: Fear-driven non-response: People who support Pahlavi but fear naming him even in anonymous surveys Information asymmetry: People whose primary information comes from filtered state media genuine indecision: A smaller subset who truly have no preference. By analyzing only those who overcame these barriers to name someone, we isolate the signal of active political preference from the noise of censorship-induced silence.

3.3 The January 2026 Natural Experiment

Roberts' "Achilles heel of friction" theory (2018, Ch. 5) [3] predicts that during crises, when citizen motivation surges, friction-based censorship fails. The January 2026 protests — triggered by Pahlavi's call to action on January 8, 2026 — represent the most dramatic confirmation of this theory in Iran's history:

- 5 million protesters across all 31 provinces and 180+ cities [4],
- Complete internet blackout for 20+ days (extreme friction),
- Death risk of $\approx 0.14\%$, arrest risk of $\approx 0.14\%$,
- Despite these costs, millions participated — a massive revealed preference event.

Following Hobbs and Roberts (2018) [7], who showed that blocking Instagram in China paradoxically increased VPN adoption, Iran's internet shutdowns during the protests likely radicalized previously passive citizens and deepened opposition [8].

3.4 Data Sources

3.4.1 GAMAAN Survey (June 2024), Published August 2025 [1]

- Raw sample: 77,216 respondents from inside Iran,
- Weighted effective sample: 20,492,
- Modality: Anonymous online via VPN,

- Published figures: Pahlavi 31%, Ahmadinejad 9%, Mohammadi 5% (of all respondents),
- Anti-IR share: 80% opposed continuation of Islamic Republic [9].

3.4.2 Reconstructed Full Candidate Breakdown

The GAMAAN report from 2024 published only the top three figures. We reconstruct the full breakdown using:

- Published 2024 figures for the top 3,
- GAMAAN's 2022 survey [10] (which reported: Pahlavi 39%, Raisi 17%, Mohammadi/Sotoudeh 15%, Alinejad 13%, Ahmadinejad 12%, plus Mousavi, Zarif, Khatami),
- The IFMAT candidate list (Pahlavi, Ali Daei, Ali Karimi, Esmaeilion, Ronaghi, Boniadi, Sepehri, Alinejad, Sotoudeh, Toomaj Salehi, Mohammadi, Molavi Abdolhamid, Farahani),
- Trend adjustments from 2022 to 2024,
- Estimated 2024 full breakdown (% of all respondents).

Table 1: Estimated 2024 full breakdown (% of all respondents)

Candidate	%of All	Source	Anti-IR Share
Reza Pahlavi	31.0%	GAMAAN published	≈ 97%
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad	9.0%	GAMAAN published	≈ 15%
Narges Mohammadi	5.0%	GAMAAN published	≈ 95%
Masih Alinejad	3.5%	Est. from 2022 trend	≈ 95%
Ali Karimi	2.5%	Est. from 2022 trend	≈ 95%
Hamed Esmaeilion	2.0%	Est. from 2022 trend	≈ 98%
Mir-Hossein Mousavi	2.0%	Est. from 2022 trend	≈ 60%
Nasrin Sotoudeh	1.5%	Est. from 2022 trend	≈ 95%
Toomaj Salehi	1.5%	Est. from 2022 trend	≈ 98%
Kaveh Madani	1.0%	Est. from 2022 trend	≈ 90%
Other named (combined)	3.0%	Residual estimate	≈ 70%
No one / Don't know	38.0%	Residual estimate	≈ 75%

Table 1 summarizes key filtering results; 62% of respondents named someone. Among anti-IR respondents who named someone ($N \approx 10,435$). Since the figures are not in the GAMAAN survey in Jun 2024, the data is estimated from the 2022 trend; the focus of the current work is on estimating the true support for Reza Pahlavi, which is available from the 2024 survey. Nonetheless, the figures with the estimated share are a small percentage compared to the top three figures.

Figure 1 shows that Pahlavi commands 59.0% — a clear supermajority — among anti-IR Iranians with an active political preference.




Figure 1: Preference distribution among anti-regime respondents

3.4.3 Instagram Follower Data

Table 2: Instagram follower data

Date	Followers	Event
Mar 2022	2.14M	Baseline
Sep 2022	2.80M	Mahsa Amini protests
Dec 2022	3.50M	Post-Woman-Life-Freedom
Jun 2024	4.50M	GAMAAN survey period
Dec 2025	6.50M	Pre-January protests
Jan 2026	7.80M	During protests
Mar 2026	9.20M	Current (Heepsy)

Table 2 tabularises the Pahlavi's Instagram Growth factor since the GAMAAN survey, which is 2.04: (4.5M → 9.2M)

3.4.4 January 2026 Protest Data

Table 3: January 2026 protest data

Variable	Value	Source
Nationwide protesters (Jan 9)	≈5,000,000	European diplomatic intelligence
Provinces	31 (all)	HRANA
Cities	180+	HRANA
Killed	3,428–6,800	Iran Human Rights / HRANA
Arrested	53,777	HRANA
Internet blackout	20+ days	Amnesty International

Table 3 summarizes the data available from the uprising in Iran that occurred in January 2026.

4. Methodology

4.1 Model 1: Bayesian Preference Falsification Correction

Rationale: Even among those who named Pahlavi in an anonymous online survey, some true supporters remain hidden. The observed 59.0% understates reality because fear persists even with VPN-based anonymity. Framework:

- θ = true support for Pahlavi among anti-IR named respondents,
- $p_{ex\ press}$ = probability of truthful expression $\in \{0.65, 0.78, 0.90\}$,
- Prior: $\theta \sim \beta(2, 4)$,
- Likelihood: Binomial $(6, 157 | 10, 435, \theta \times p_{ex\ press})$,
- Posterior: Grid approximation over $\theta \in [0.01, 0.99]$,

Central estimate uses $p_{ex\ press} = 0.78$, informed by Robinson and Tannenber [\[11\]](#) on self-censorship in authoritarian online environments.

4.2 Model 2: Instagram Growth-Rate Extrapolation

Rationale: Support has grown substantially since June 2024, as evidenced by Instagram follower growth of 2.04×. Framework:

- Anchor: 59.0% (GAMAAN named anti-IR, June 2024),
- Growth factor: $9.2M/4.5M = 2.04\times$,
- Elasticity: $Support_{growth} = 1 + \beta \times (IG_{growth} - 1)$, $\beta \in \{0.3, 0.5, 0.7\}$,
- $\beta < 1$ accounts for diaspora followers and non-linear support dynamics.

4.3 Model 3: Protest-Calibrated Estimation Rationale

The January 2026 protests were triggered by Pahlavi's specific call to action. An estimated 80% of protesters were responding to his call. Note that the estimated numbers used in this model may propagate uncertainty into the final estimate; however, since direct measurement of the pretest participants is impractical, we treat the measurement as a scale estimate. Framework:

- Pahlavi-specific protesters: $5M \times 0.80 = 4M$,
- Supporter-to-protester multiplier $\in \{3, 5, 7\}$,
- Denominator: anti-IR adults who would name a figure = $60M \times 0.80 \times 0.60 = 28.8M$.

4.4 Summary (Triangulation)

The three models represent an independent measure of support. One way to estimate the overall support is to use a weighted average. The direct survey has the highest weight, and Instagram growth is used as an indirect measure with the lowest weight in the triangulation measure.

$$\theta f_{final} = 0.40 \times \theta_{Model1} + 0.25\theta_{Model2} + 0.35 \times \theta_{Model3}$$

Weights reflect: survey data (most direct, 0.40), IG proxy (indirect, 0.25), protest data (strong revealed preference signal, 0.35).

4.5 Sensitivity Analysis

54 scenarios varying: $p_{ex\ press} \in \{0.65\text{--}0.90\}$, protest multiplier $\in \{3, 5, 7\}$, $IG_{elasticity} \text{ y } \beta \in \{0.3, 0.5, 0.7\}$.

5. Results

5.1 Model 1: Preference Falsification Correction

Based on Table 4, in Model 1, even at the most conservative assumption ($p = 0.90$, minimal self-censorship), Pahlavi's support among anti-IR named respondents exceeds 65%.

Table 4: Results of Pahlavi's support for deploying Model 1

Expression Rate (p)	True Support (θ)	95% Credible Interval
0.65 (low — high fear)	90.6%	[89.2%, 92.0%]
0.78 (central)	75.6%	[74.4%, 76.8%]
0.90 (high — low fear)	65.5%	[64.5%, 66.5%]

5.2 Model 2: IG Growth-Adjusted

Table 5: Results of Pahlavi's Instagram growth model

Elasticity (θ)	Growth Factor	Estimated Support
0.3 (conservative)	1.31×	77.5%
0.5 (central)	1.52×	89.8%
0.7 (liberal)	1.73×	95.0% (capped)

Table 5 summarizes the event study: the January 2026 protests produced a 285% acceleration in daily follower growth ($0.116\%/day \rightarrow 0.447\%/day$), confirming a massive preference-revelation event.

5.3 Model 3: Protest-Calibrated Estimation Rationale

Table 6: Deploying Model 3 estimates the number of protesters responding to Pahlavi's call

Multiplier	Pahlavi Supporters	% of Target Population
3× (conservative)	12M	41.7%
5× (central)	20M	69.4%
7× (high repression adj.)	28M	95.0% (capped)

Table 6 shows the results of deploying Model 3 to estimate the number of protesters responding to Pahlavi's call.

5.4 Triangulated Estimate

Table 7: Triangulated estimation

Model	Estimate	Weight
Pref. Falsification ($p = 0.78$)	75.6%	0.40
IG Growth ($\beta = 0.5$)	89.8 %	0.25
Protest-Calibrated (5×)	69.4%	0.35
Triangulated	77.0%	1.00

Table 7 estimates Pahlavi's support using the Triangulation equation.

5.5 Sensitivity Analysis

Table 8 shows all 54 scenarios place Pahlavi's support above 60%.

6. Summary

Pahlavi holds a commanding supermajority — approximately three-quarters — of politically engaged anti-IR.

Table 8: Sensitivity analysis of results

Statistic	Value
Median	76.8%
Mean	76.7%
25th percentile	70.0%
75th percentile	83.4%
Minimum	60.2%
Maximum	93.3%

Table 9: January 2026 protest data

Metric	Value
Raw GAMAAN (named, anti-IR)	59.0%
Triangulated estimate (Mar 2026)	77.0%
Sensitivity IQR	70.0% – 83.4%
Full range	60.2% – 93.3%
As % of all adult Iranians	≈ 37%
Absolute estimate	≈ 22 million adults

7. Discussion

7.1 The Named-Preference Filter Amplifies Signal

Figure 2 shows that filtering to named-preference respondents transforms the picture dramatically:




Figure 2: Change of Pahlavi's support using Named-Preference Filter

This 59% → 75.6% → 77.0% progression reflects three layers of hidden support:

- 1) Dilution by non-namers (+20 points when filtering to named-only),
- 2) Self-censorship correction (+17 points via preference falsification model),
- 3) Temporal growth (additional gains from IG growth and protest revelation).

7.2 Connections to Roberts' Framework: Fear as a Filter

Roberts (2018) argues that fear-based censorship disproportionately silences the most vulnerable populations. In Iran, lower-income, rural, and less-educated citizens face higher relative costs for expressing political preferences. The "Don't know" category in GAMAAN likely contains a disproportionate share of these fear-driven non-responses. Our named-only analysis controls for this by examining the segment that overcame fear barriers. The protest as preference cascade: Kuran's (1991) [12] threshold model predicts that preference falsification can collapse suddenly when a trigger lowers expression costs [13]. Pahlavi's January 8, 2026, call to action served as precisely this trigger — converting latent support into observable protest participation. The 5 million who protested despite extreme repression represent the tip of a much larger iceberg of support. Normalization and de-normalization: Roberts' 2025 paper on censorship normalization suggests that prolonged censorship creates genuine apathy. The January 2026 events may mark a "de-normalization" moment — where accumulated grievances (economic collapse, internet shutdowns, violent repression) shattered the psychological equilibrium of normalized acquiescence.

7.3 Why the Nearest Competitor is Distant

The second-most-popular figure among anti-IR named respondents is Narges Mohammadi at 9.3% — a 6.3× gap. This level of dominance is unusual in fragmented opposition movements and suggests Pahlavi has achieved focal-point status (Schelling

[14]) — a coordination mechanism that enables collective action without formal organization.

King, Pan, and Roberts [15, 16] identified collective action potential as authoritarian regimes' primary concern; Pahlavi's unique ability to coordinate nationwide protests from exile confirms this threat assessment.

7.4 Implications

- 1) Pahlavi is the overwhelming consensus figure among politically engaged anti-IR named respondents.
- 2) His support has grown substantially since mid-2024, driven by the January 2026 protests.
- 3) Even the most conservative estimates (sensitivity minimum: 60.2%) place him well above majority status among named-preference anti-IR respondents.
- 4) The gap between Pahlavi and all other figures is so large that no coalition of alternatives approaches his support level.

8. Limitations

8.1 Survey and Protest Participation Connection

The GAMAAN survey was conducted in June 2024, and there has been no subsequent data to support the January 2026 data. Therefore, the protest data is used as a scenario-based estimate anchored in the 2024 survey. In addition, the response to the call may measure mobilization or responsiveness rather than stable underlying support. A post-protest survey is required to directly measure the support level.

8.2 Model 1 Approach

Model 1 effectively links observed support to true support through an expression probability. However, it should be noted that censorship could perhaps shape responses in several ways, such as silence, "don't know," no answer, or even displacement toward another named figure. The model aims to correct for the "don't know" form of falsification.

8.3 Reconstruction Uncertainty

The full candidate breakdown for GAMAAN 2024 is partially estimated. The published report provides only the top 3 figures (Pahlavi 31%, Ahmadinejad 9%, Mohammadi 5%). Remaining figures are estimated from 2022 patterns, introducing uncertainty. The key filtering result (59.0% for Pahlavi among anti-IR named respondents) is most sensitive to the total share of "named someone" respondents — our estimate of 62% is plausible but unverified against the full data.

8.4 Anti-IR Classification of Named Respondents

We assume that 97% of Pahlavi supporters, 95% of Mohammadi supporters, etc., are anti-IR. These shares are estimated based on political alignment but not directly cross-tabulated from the data.

8.5 Expression Probability

The central $p_{ex\ press} = 0.78$ is based on literature rather than Iran-specific empirical calibration. If $p_{ex\ press}$ is actually higher (say 0.90), the corrected estimate falls to 65.5% — still a supermajority.

8.6 Instagram as Proxy

The Instagram data are used not as a direct measure but as proxies for growth in support over time. Not all followers are from inside Iran. Follower growth includes diaspora and international accounts. The connection between political support and the followers on Instagram is also unknown. The elasticity parameter β mediates this, but its true value is unknown.

8.7 Protest Attribution

We estimate 80% of January 2026 protesters were responding specifically to Pahlavi's call. This is informed by the timeline (his January 8 call preceded the January 9 peak) but cannot be precisely verified.

9. Conclusion and Future Work

Table 10: Summary of results

Metric	Value
Raw GAMAAN (named, anti-IR)	59.0%
Corrected for preference falsification	75.6%
IG growth-adjusted	89.8%
Protest-calibrated	69.4%
Triangulated central estimate	77.0%
Sensitivity IQR	70.0% – 83.4%

Table 10 summarizes the key findings of this study. Among Iranians who oppose the Islamic Republic and actively name a preferred transitional leader, Reza Pahlavi commands approximately 77% support (IQR: 70% – 83%) as of March 2026. This represents a commanding supermajority — roughly three-quarters of the politically engaged anti-regime respondents. The nearest competitor, Narges Mohammadi, holds less than 10%. Three independent estimation strategies converge on this finding:

- 1) Bayesian correction of the GAMAAN survey for censorship-driven preference falsification yields 75.6%.
- 2) Instagram growth trajectory (2.04× since the survey) indicates accelerating support, yielding up to 89.8%

- 3) January 2026 protest participation (5 million, with 80% responding to Pahlavi's call) calibrates to 69.4%.

The January 2026 uprising — the largest in Iran's modern history — served as a natural experiment in preference revelation, consistent with Roberts' (2018) prediction that friction-based censorship fails when citizen motivation surges. Pahlavi's unique ability to coordinate nationwide collective action from exile, commanding millions to bear extreme personal costs, provides the strongest possible revealed-preference evidence of his political support. As Roberts teaches us, in authoritarian contexts, the truth about political preferences lies not in what people say, but in what they do when the stakes are highest. We acknowledge that the GAMAAN survey was conducted before the massive protests in Iran in January of 2026. A follow-up survey with enlarged groups of participants is necessary to directly examine the Fear-Friction-Flooding censorship, gather more relevant information, and reduce uncertainty.

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Ethics, Consent to Participate, and Consent to Publish Statements

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Conflict of Interest Statement

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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Appendix A: Full Candidate Reconstruction Methodology

The GAMAAN 2024 survey published percentages for three named figures: Pahlavi (31%), Ahmadinejad (9%), and Mohammadi (5%). The remaining breakdown was estimated as follows:

- 1) GAMAAN 2022 baseline: Used published approval ratings (Pahlavi 39%, Raisi 17%, Mohammadi/Sotoudeh 15%, Alinejad 13%, Ahmadinejad/Nourizad/Madani 12%, plus Mousavi, Zarif, Khatami).
- 2) Trend adjustments: Applied decline factors observed for the top 3 (Pahlavi $39\% \approx 31\% = 0.79\times$ decline; Mohammadi $15\% \rightarrow 5\% = 0.33\times$ decline) to estimate other figures. Alinejad: $13\% \times 0.27 \approx 3.5\%$. Note: 2022 used approval ratings (multiple selections) while 2024 used first/second choice (more restrictive), so larger declines for secondary figures are expected.
- 3) Anti-IR share assignment: Based on each figure's known political alignment. Opposition figures (Pahlavi, Mohammadi, Alinejad, Karimi, Esmaeilion, Sotoudeh, Salehi, Madani) assigned 90 – 98% anti-IR. Regime-adjacent figures (Ahmadinejad) assigned 85% pro-IR. Mixed figures (Mousavi as former reformist) assigned 60% anti-IR.
- 4) "No one / Don't know" residual: The remaining 38% is consistent with typical non-response rates in authoritarian-context surveys and with the observation that GAMAAN's question format (open-ended naming) produces higher non-response than multiple-choice formats.

Appendix B: Statistical Code (Python)

a. Data Reconstruction

```
import pandas as pd, numpy as np from scipy import stats
```

```
candidates_2024 = pd.DataFrame({  
'candidate': ['Reza Pahlavi', 'Mahmoud Ahmadinejad', 'Narges Mohammadi', 'Masih  
Alinejad', 'Ali Karimi', 'Hamed Esmaeilion',  
'Mir-Hossein Mousavi', 'Nasrin Sotoudeh', 'Toomaj Salehi', 'Kaveh Madani', 'Other  
named', 'No one / DK'],  
'pct_all': [31.0, 9.0, 5.0, 3.5, 2.5, 2.0, 2.0, 1.5, 1.5, 1.0, 3.0, 38.0],  
'anti_ir_share': [0.97, 0.15, 0.95, 0.95, 0.95, 0.98, 0.60, 0.95, 0.98, 0.90, 0.70, 0.75]  
})
```

```
named = candidates_2024[candidates_2024['candidate'] != 'No one / DK'] total_named =  
named['pct_all'].sum() # 62%  
named['anti_ir_pct'] = named['pct_all'] * named['anti_ir_share'] total_anti_ir_named =  
named['anti_ir_pct'].sum() # ~50.9% named['share_anti_ir_named'] =  
named['anti_ir_pct'] / total_anti_ir_named * 100 # Pahlavi: 59.0% of anti-IR who named  
someone
```

b. Model 1: Bayesian Preference Falsification

```
s_obs = 0.590; n_eff = 10435; p_express = 0.78  
theta_grid = np.linspace(0.01, 0.99, 1000)  
prior = stats.beta.pdf(theta_grid, 2, 4); prior /= prior.sum() s_count = int(s_obs * n_eff)  
lik = np.array([stats.binom.pmf(s_count, n_eff, min(t*p_express, 0.999)) for t in  
theta_grid]) lik /= (lik.sum() + 1e-300)  
post = prior * lik; post /= (post.sum() + 1e-300) theta_mean = np.sum(theta_grid * post)  
# 75.6% cum = np.cumsum(post)  
ci = (theta_grid[np.searchsorted(cum, 0.025)], theta_grid[np.searchsorted(cum, 0.975)])
```

c. IG Growth Extrapolation

```
gf = 9.2 / 4.5 # 2.04x  
beta = 0.5  
current_support = min(0.590 * (1 + beta * (gf - 1)), 0.95) # $89.8\%$  
\subsection*{ Model 3: Protest-Calibrated} pahlavi_protesters = 5e6 * 0.80 # 4M  
multiplier = 5  
denom = 60e6 * 0.80 * 0.60 # 28.8M  
est = min((pahlavi_protesters * multiplier) / denom, 0.95) # $69.4\%$  
\subsection*{ Triangulation and Sensitivity}  
tri = 0.40 * 0.756 + 0.25 * 0.898 + 0.35 * 0.694 # $77.0\%$  
results = []
```

```
for p in [0.65, 0.70, 0.75, 0.80, 0.85, 0.90]:  
for m in [3, 5, 7]:  
for b in [0.3, 0.5, 0.7]:  
e1 = min(0.590 / p, 0.99)  
e2 = min(0.590 * (1 + b * (2.04 - 1)), 0.95)  
e3 = min((4e6 * m) / 28.8e6, 0.95) results.append(0.40*e1 + 0.25*e2 + 0.35*e3)  
# Median: 76.8$\%$, IQR: $[70.0\%$, 83.4\%]$
```

Appendix C: Robustness Checks

Alternative Named-Share Assumptions

If "named someone" = 55% (more conservative) instead of 62%:

- Pahlavi among anti-IR named = $31/(550.800.97/0.80) \approx 62.7\%$
- Triangulated estimate shifts to $\approx 79.5\%$

If "named someone" = 70% (more liberal):

- Pahlavi among anti-IR named $\approx 55.8\%$
- Triangulated estimate shifts to $\approx 74.3\%$ Range across assumptions: 74.3% – 79.5% — robust.

C.2 Alternative Triangulation Weights

Weighting	Triangulated
Equal (0.33/0.33/0.33)	78.3%
Survey-heavy (0.50/0.20/0.30)	76.5%
Protest-heavy (0.30/0.20/0.50)	75.6%
Central (0.40/0.25/0.35)	77.0%

Range: 75.6% – 78.3% — highly robust.

Alternative Protest Attribution

If only 60% (not 80%) of protesters were Pahlavi-specific:

- Model 3: $3M \times 5/28.8M = 52.1\%$
- Triangulated: 71.0%

If 90% were Pahlavi-specific:

- Model 3: $4.5M \times 5/28.8M = 78.1\%$
- Triangulated: 80.0%

Range: 71.0% – 80.0% — robust above 70%.